Ernst Zündel Replies:
Rebuttal # 25
Great Britain did not and does not benefit from the status quo pertaining to the Holocaust Myth, but certain sectors of the elite of the United Kingdom did – and do.
British involvement in World War II and subsequent gain, such as it was, must be seen in the historical context of the last two wars.
Britain was not much different from the rest of the countries that did the bidding of International Finance and took up arms against their Aryan brothers. This country has excused and camouflaged its action ever since.
Every year for more than half a century, Britain has observed anniversaries of the war’s major events with many media stories, and ringing speeches by dignitaries within the context of elaborate commemorative ceremonies. Cable TV stations run documentaries on the war – week after week in endless “military victory” self-congratulations. If the stations broadcasting this ancient propaganda were operated directly by the government, these documentaries would probably more readily be recognized for what they are – propaganda writ large – but since they are not, they are often mistaken for “objective” reporting of history.
Three generations after the end of WWII, almost all of the people who led the world into the most destructive war in history are dead. Winston Churchill was one of them. In a few years, those old enough to remember the war will follow them. One has to ask oneself: What was the point? What IS the point? Why such relentless media assault when hardly anybody cares? Why are the British people exposed to this continuous slop when other historical events, much more important to the welfare of the British populace, remain largely ignored? Surely there is as much film footage on the “police action” in Vietnam, or Korea, or any number of conflicts of this century? Yet these don’t get the constant air play and attention WWII does – with all of its sickening “Holocaust” stories.
The easy explanation for this phenomenon is that WWII is regarded by many in Britain as a “good war”–maybe the best war ever. It is a tactic to bind up some very serious sores.
Before Germany began its recovery from the Versailles treaty in the 1930’s, Britain was considered a great power, especially a sea power, because her empire stretched around the world. When all was said and done, England was broke and her colonies began leaving the empire at a rapid rate.
Then why was it “worth it” to Britain?
The benefits to the U.S., to Israel and organized Jewry, and to the former U.S.S.R are pretty obvious. These Allied powers emerged from the blood bath as global superpowers leaving those who considered themselves ten years earlier to be “great powers” to fall into the political pull of either the Russians or the Americans (and to the covert control of organized Jewry) and began to orbit around either of these giants–all the while hoping the two overt giants, confronting each other in the Cold War, would not collide and start a hot war after all.
So where is the good in all that?
There isn’t any – but the English elite have established a WWII fantasy world that serves its interests, which is to keep itself in power. Skeletons need to be hidden. That, for the English elite, is what matters. There is emotional, financial and political coinage to be mined. The “good” names of old families need to be protected at any cost, no matter how hurtful for Britain. (That’s why, incidentally, the Rudolf Hess file will only be opened in 2017 – if ever!)
World War II was certainly the bloodiest and most destructive of all wars. Why would anyone consider it “good”? In order to answer this question the war must be examined from the perspective of the beneficiaries of WWII. Certainly someone had to benefit for a war to be considered “good”.
The obvious place to look for likely beneficiaries is among the victorious Allies whose major partners were the British, the Soviets, the Americans and, to a smaller extent, China and France. In order to understand the lie the British power structure is living, one has to go back to Neville Chamberlain’s Prime Ministership in the 1930’s.
The outcome of WWI had left the European continent a politically unstable place. The borders which were drawn in the formation of the Treaty of Versailles left many ethnic minorities stranded and unhappy in countries now dominated by newly nationalistic majorities. After Hitler came to spectacular power in Germany, the unstable structure set up twenty years before began crumbling. The German chancellor took this opportunity to acquire or recover territory containing German-speaking majorities that had once belonged to Germany, including the Sudetenland. He incorporated them back into Germany.
England at this point was in no position to stop this revision of European borders on its own, and France was reluctant to put its neck out for Czechoslovakia, for instance, which was not a politically viable entity anyway. Chamberlain, who could see that the traditional balance of power strategy England pursued on the continent was no longer viable either, agreed to the German annexation of the Sudetenland, a region which had a German majority.
Winston Churchill opposed Chamberlain’s agreement with Hitler and accused him of following a policy of appeasement. The situation England found itself in was one in which she could not fight Germany alone and had no ally willing to fight Germany with her. The balance of power strategy in Europe, which had sought to prevent the creation of a single politically dominant state, was now obsolete with the rise of Germany under Adolf Hitler.
The closest ally Britain could hope to find to successfully oppose Germany in Europe in the 1930’s was Communist Russia – but such an alliance would have to be on Russia’s, not England’s terms. England’s days as an independent power, prepared to throw its weight behind any country in Europe in order to prevent any other country from becoming dominant, were now behind her.
Chamberlain understood the situation. Churchill did not.
Once Germany started with the invasion of Poland, England replaced Chamberlain with Churchill as prime minister. After the defeat of France, Churchill looked to the United States to save his “valiant little England” from Germany.
One of the outcomes of this move was that Winston Churchill succeeded in bringing the U.S. officially into the war on England’s side in 1941. Four years later, England was “victorious” over Germany once more.
That was a heady moment. But at what price?
England had expended all of its wealth and prestige in the process. Its “victory” was purely nominal. Though Germany was defeated, Stalin controlled all of eastern Europe, including Poland, for which England had ostensibly gone to war in the first place. Stalin controlled all that, save Greece, and even there British influence was being challenged by Marxists, taking their cues from Moscow. Churchill had fought Germany to defend the balance of power in Europe, but now Russia had replaced Germany in domination and England had no ally on the continent to oppose a total Communist takeover of Europe.
Churchill’s cagey new strategy at that point was to form a “special relationship” with the U.S. In blunter words, he rode on America’s coat tails. His belief was that Britain with all of her ancient prestige and experience in international affairs could get the United States to act as the brawn behind England’s brains. England would be America’s “mentor and guide” in the complicated world of international relations.
It was the myth of this new relationship with which England consoled itself as a “has-been” great power – and has consoled itself ever since. It was, and is, a pyrrhic victory at best.
But what alternatives did Britain have to the suicidal course it took?
Several recent books on British policy have examined this question and have suggested that it would have been much better to have come to terms with Germany after the defeat of France, or even before, and to have tried to salvage the Empire. America – with all its shady forces behind America – now calls the shots, and Britain is little more than a “has-been” and knows it. Since Russia replaced Germany as the dominant force on the continent and England had lost everything anyway and now depended on America, just what had England gained?
For one, it had gained NATO.
To meet the new threat to Europe, NATO was formed – designed, according to one English official, to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.”
The first had to be done in order to accomplish the other two. Though Germany was literally dead as a political entity, the need for American forces in Europe did not go away. So Churchill’s “special alliance” with the U.S. was, and is, clung to by the English who could not face the new challenges alone.
When discerning people look at England now, it’s question piled on question. Why couldn’t England have come to terms with Hitler? Nearly any argument against dealing with Hitler could also be made against dealing with either Stalin or Roosevelt.
In dealing with Hitler, the Empire might have been spared.
Britain MUST argue today that dealing with Hitler was out of the question on moral grounds because the Nazi regime was “intolerably evil”. By arguing this line, one easily bypasses the question as to just precisely what it was that made Hitler and the Nazis more evil than that mass murderer, Josef Stalin, and who was England’s Soviet ally.
The answer is, of course, the “Holocaust”.
Watch late night cable TV re-broadcasts of the BBC-produced “The World At War” long enough and it becomes pretty obvious. According to the wartime propaganda, Nazi Germany was “out to conquer to world” and was a threat to everyone. In addition, the Nazis were aiming to kill everyone they didn’t like in concentration camps equipped with gas chambers. Reams of gruesome footage of dead bodies in concentration camps are shown over and over to demonstrate that charges of the unparalleled evil of the Germans is true and was well worth an empire.
So the Holocaust story props up British foreign policy which was responsible for England’s disastrous fratricidal war on the continent and ushered in its decline. It protects its policies and policy makers from critical examination and analysis. The “death camps” put Hitler post-humously beyond the pale and the British power elite beyond very justified criticism.
This is one view, and it is well worth pondering. A more truthful and tragic view advanced by historians like David Irving is that Churchill himself was a victim of blackmail whose gambling and stock market debts were canceled by Jewish money lenders and bankers like Stoakosh and Baruch. Winston Churchill was therefore beholden to the Shadow Government and flushed the interests of his country and his people down into the sewers of International Finance, to save his own miserable self from bankruptcy and exposed as an international forger of famous painters.
Understanding the saga of World War II is important. The roles major powers play today are embedded in that war. The justification for the roles and policies of the powers in the postwar era is rooted in the war and how the war is viewed.
Two good books about British society and foreign policy are “Churchill’s Grand Alliance” by John Charmley (1995) Harcourt Brace & Co. and “Brain Wash: The Cover-up Society” by Guy Arnold (1992) Virgin Books.
“Churchill’s War Volume I” by David Irving (1987) and “Churchill: The End of Glory” by John Charmley (1993) are also very good works which cover the formation of the Anglo-American “special relationship.”